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1 
Introduction 
 
For the past quarter century or so, economists and policy analysts have debated the efficacy 
of alternative institutional arrangements in advanced capitalist economies.  In the 1970s some 
analysts declared “neo-corporatist” economies superior to others because they purportedly 
dealt better with inflation (Bruno and Sachs, 1985).  In the 1980s many saw Japanese 
institutions as ideal, while others favoured the German “Rhineland” model, both of which 
supposedly had longer run financial perspective in capital markets than the US or UK and 
both of which gave greater training to ordinary workers, either on the job as part of lifetime 
employment or through formal apprenticeships.  In the late 1980s some argued that 
centralized wage-setting where all-encompassing unions negotiate with employer 
associations worked about as well as decentralized systems (Calmfors and Driffil, 1988), 
leaving countries with industry level bargaining at the bottom of league tables.  The late 
1990s/early 2000s has been the heyday of the American model (Freeman, 2000).  Persistently 
high levels of joblessness in many EU countries and the sluggish economic performance of 
Japan contributed to a growing belief that economies do better when, like the US, they rely 
primarily on markets and minimize institutional interventions.  In fact, throughout the 1990s, 
and in many cases the 1980s, advanced countries have reformed their economies in market-
friendly ways. 
 To what extent, if at all, does the evidence support the view that market-oriented 
(US style) economies do better than others?  Or past claims that more centralized economies 
or those with lifetime employment do better?  Are the institutional differences among 
advanced countries reliably related to economic performance? 
 These are difficult questions to answer.  Economic theory does not favour one 
variant of capitalism over another but rather recognizes that different institutional 
arrangements have strengths and weaknesses, depending on market externalities, information 
asymmetries, and the economic environment.  If transactions costs are sufficiently low, in 
fact, the Coase Theorem predicts that institutional arrangements will affect distribution but 
not efficiency.  In this case, any judgement of which arrangements work better depends on 
the weights placed on the well-being of various groups.  Since theory is ambiguous, the “war 
of the models” is not a battle of dueling economic wizards with their mathematical wands and 
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game theoretic potions.  Rather, it is an empirical debate about the role institutions play in 
economic performance (Freeman, 1998).  
 But the empirics are difficult.  One reason is that measuring differences in 
institutions among countries is fraught with uncertainty.  As we shall see experts sometimes 
disagree about categorization of different countries along a particular institutional dimension.  
A second problem is that institutions potentially fit together into economic systems, so that 
individual features may affect outcomes differently depending on the configuration of other 
institutions.  Some institutions may be complementary or may conflict with others.  Third, 
institutional policies may vary over time in response to perceived economic problems or 
changes, muddying any observed causal link between changes in institutions and changes in 
outcomes.  The British unions of the 2001 have different attitudes and policies than those of 
the 1970s, for example.  Fourth, since the economic environment changes, analysts must 
assess the evolution of institutions as well as their impact on performance in any given 
period.  Being flexible may be more important than operating optimally under one set of 
circumstances.  Fifth, the small number of advanced countries and limited time series from 
which to make inferences provides little degrees of freedom against which to test hypotheses.  
As in cross-country analyses of growth, the number of possible configurations of institutions 
and explanatory variables potentially exceeds the number of observations (see Durlauf and 
Quah, 1999). 
 Despite these and other problems, it is important to distill what we can from the 
cross country evidence about the link between institutions and outcomes, if only to dispel 
strong claims of what will or will not happen when a country changes its institutions.  
 This paper explores the link between the institutiona l arrangements of advanced 
OECD countries and economic outcomes from the 1970s through 2000.  Section 1 compares 
differences in overall economic institutions among advanced capitalist countries using 
measures of “economic freedom”.  The principal finding is that advanced country institutions 
have become more market friendly in the 1980s and 1990s, reducing institutional differences 
among them. Section 2 compares institutions in labor markets, product markets, and capital 
markets.  It finds that these differences roughly parallel those in economic freedom, but that 
there is increased diversity in unionization and collective bargaining coverage over time.  
Section 3 assesses the cross sectional link between economic outcomes and institutions and 
the longitudinal link between changes in institutions and changes in outcomes.  It finds only a 
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tenuous link that is more naturally consistent with the view that advanced capitalism permits 
institutional diversity than that it dictates a particular “peak” institutional form.  This result 
for the advanced OECD countries differs sharply from identical analyses of the link between 
institutions and outcomes in less developed countries. 
 
 
1.  Aggregate Institutional Differences 
 
The natural measuring rod for analyzing economic institutions in the aggregate is the extent 
to which they create a market environment close to the competitive market model.  Three free 
market oriented think tanks – the Fraser Institute, Heritage Foundation/WSJ, and Freedom 
House – have tried to measure how far given economies are from their perceptions of an ideal 
competitive system.  Each combines judgmental indicators of private property rights, 
freedom to operate a business, freedom of capital, free trade, etc. into single measures of 
“economic freedom”.  With a somewhat different goal, the World Economic Forum/IMD has 
developed a competitiveness indicator of the fitness of countries in the global market, using 
qualitative information on institutions and policies and quantitative measures on actual 
performance.   
 The indices have weaknesses.  They are weighted linear sums of sub- indices, with 
the weights determined subjectively.  They ignore potential complementarities or 
substitutions among institutions.  They deal cursorily with enforcement of regulations that 
limit markets.  And they do not pay adequate attention to the labour market institutions which 
dominated the 1980s-1990s debates over the war of the models.  They differ in several ways 
among themselves (Messick, 1996; Hanke and Walters, 1997).  The Fraser Institute index 
includes:  military conscription, top marginal tax rates, transfers and subsidies, the size of 
government expenditure.  The Heritage Foundation/WSJ index includes corporate and valued 
added taxes, as well as government expenditure, but ignores conscription and individual tax 
rates.  The Freedom House index values freedom of association for workers but not taxes nor 
the size of government.  The Fraser and Heritage measures include low inflation, which is an 
outcome of institutions and policies, rather than a measure of freedom in markets.  Even so, 
the indices give a comparable picture of where countries fit along a market 
friendly/institutional intervention spectrum.  For all countries, including the less developed 
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countries, Hanke and Walters show high rank correlations between the indices that range 
from 0.72 to 0.85 in 1995-6. 
 
How Countries Rate in Economic Freedom and Competitiveness 
 
Columns 1-3 of Table 1 records the scores of 23 advanced OECD countries and averages for 
other countries in the Fraser, Heritage/WSJ, and Freedom House indices of economies in 
1995-96.  The Fraser and Freedom House measures give countries with greater market 
freedoms higher numeric scores.  The Heritage/WSJ gives them low scores.  Recognizing 
this, there is a strong similarity in the rating of OECD countries.  The top five countries in the 
Fraser index are:  the US, UK, New Zealand, Switzerland, and (tied) Australia and Ireland.  
The top five in Heritage Index are:  US, UK, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Netherlands.  
All of these, save for Australia and Ireland score the highest possible in economic freedom in 
the Freedom House measure.  At the bottom of the Fraser index are Greece, Italy, Austria, 
Portugal and (tied) Sweden and Spain.  At the bottom of the Heritage index are Greece, 
Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Sweden.  While Freedom House gives Sweden its highest score, it 
gives the others relatively low scores for advanced OECD countries.  The correlations 
between the ratings are high for the Fraser and Heritage/WSJ measures (.83); and lower but 
still significant between the Heritage/WSJ and Freedom House measures (.48) and between 
the Fraser and Freedom House measures (.61) 
 Comparing the measures for the advanced OECD countries with those for the 
groupings of non-OECD economies in the table shows, further, that the OECD economies 
form a reasonably well-defined cluster:  the mean score for the advanced OECD countries is 
markedly higher in the relevant economic freedom metric than the mean score for all of the 
other groups, save the NICs, where Hong Kong and Singapore have high economic freedom 
scores.   
 An important reason for the divergence between the advanced OECD 
economies/NICs from the other economies is that these economies score the maximum or 
near the maximum in the sub indices measuring legal structure and property rights.  In the 
Fraser index, 15 of the 22 OECD countries score a perfect 100 in legal structure/ property 
rights; 6 score 90 or better, and only Greece scores relatively low, 75.  By contrast, exclusive 
of the NICs, no other country has a perfect score on the legal structure/property rights sub 
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index.  The pattern suggests a hierarchical relation between institutions and economic well-
being:  property rights and market transactions are necessary though perhaps not sufficient to 
attain advanced country level success. 
 Column 4 gives the World Economic Forum/IMD competitiveness ranking of 
OECD countries in19961.  Because this index includes measures of actual economic 
performance and such factors as education and training of workers on which EU and Nordic 
countries do relatively well in addition to the market friendliness of economic institutions, it 
differs from the freedom indices.2  Denmark, for instance, is 3rd among the countries in the 
table, and Sweden is 7th and Germany 8th.3  As a result the correlations between the 
competitiveness rank and the indices of economic freedom are much lower than the 
correlations among those indices.  The correlations of the competitiveness rank are 0.52 with 
the Fraser index; 0.52 with the Heritage index; and 0.55 with the Freedom House index.  
Column 5 gives the competitiveness scores for 1999.  It shows considerable changes in a 
brief period of time, with the English-speaking countries of Australia, Ireland, UK, and 
Canada rising sharply while Denmark, Germany, Japan, Norway fall.  This reflects the 
perceived as well as actual short term performance of these economies, rather than major 
institutional changes.  By mixing performance and social policies with market institutions, 
the competitiveness scores are less appropriate for our analysis than the economic freedom 
indices; and I shall exclude it from further analysis.4 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The World Economic Forum ranks more countries.  I have taken the rankings of OECD 
countries and re-ranked them, leaving out other countries. 
2 In 1990 the World Economic Forum/IMD used 326 criteria to measure competitiveness, 
mixing quantitative data and qualitative assessments by managers within countries.   
3 In its 1990 rating the World Economic Forum put Germany number 1 and Japan number 2 
while scoring the UK and New Zealand 12th and 13th behind Sweden and Austria at 10th and 
11th. 
4 The 1999 competitiveness report distinguishes micro competitiveness from the broader 
competitiveness indicator.  The index of micro competitiveness would seem to be closer to 
the economic freedom index, but it also brings in factors beyond the degree to which an 
economy operates closely to the competitive mode, and is more weakly correlated with the 
freedom indices than the overall competitiveness measure:  correlations of 0.44 with Fraser, 
0.50 with Heritage, 0.50 with the Freedom House indices for 1996. 
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Changes over time, Fraser Institute Index, 1970-1997 
 
The most useful index for assessing changes over time in the market orientation of countries 
is the Fraser Institute index.  This index extends back to 1970, while the Heritage/WSJ index 
began in 1995 and the Freedom House index is available only in 1996.  Table 2 gives the  
Fraser indices for advanced OECD countries from 1970 to 1995, by the five year intervals in 
which the Institute reported it, and for 1997.  From 1970 to 1975 this measure shows a 
decline in economic freedom in all countries but the US and Sweden – the result of 
governments’ struggle to control the oil price rise induced inflation.  Since the US introduced 
wage and price controls in this period, a market freedom measure that paid greater attention 
to the labor market would have lowered the US score as well.5  From the 1980s through 1997, 
the economic freedom scores rise, reflecting market-oriented reform in the advanced world.  
Some countries, such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand, made major changes in their 
institutions in this period, and rise from the mid or lower ranks of countries to the top of the 
economic freedom index scales.  In 1975, the UK ranked 33rd among the countries in the 
table.  In 1997, the UK stood second to the US among the countries covered.  By contrast, 
Germany, France, and Italy increased their economic freedom scores slowly and fall in 
relative position. With a maximum value of 100 for the index, the trend almost necessarily 
reduces any measure of institutional variation.  The coefficient of variation in the index in 
fact fell from 0.19 in 1975 to 0.05 in 1997, with much of the drop occurring between 1985 
and 19906 
 
 
                                                 
5 The Fraser index did not include a measure of wage-setting in its earliest ratings, though it 
added one later.  
6 I also calculated correlation coefficients between the Fraser index scores between the 
specified years.  The resultant correlations are given below: 
 1995 1990 1985 1980 1975 
1990 .78     
1985 .59 .84    
1980 .52 .76 .95   
1975 .39 .72 .86 .92  
1970 .38 .66 .80 .89 .88. 
The correlation between adjacent years is quite high, varying form 0.78 (19990-1995) to 0.95 
(1980-1985).  But the correlation between the 1970 and 1995 economic freedom scores being 
0.38, implies less stability over the long run. 
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2.  Institutions Governing Particular Markets  
 
An alternative approach to measuring institutions is to focus on the institutional structure of 
particular markets.  Given the widespread belief that unions, unemployment insurance, and 
other labour institutions and policies are key determinants of wage inflation and 
unemployment, many analysts have developed measures of those institutions.  As of 2001, 
there were at least 11 different indices of the centralization or coordination of wage-setting 
institutions (OECD, 1997; Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta, 1998) and several measures of 
employment protection regulations.  Outside of the labour market, the OECD has developed a 
regulatory data base to measure the extent of interventions in product markets while 
corporate finance scholars have developed indices of the ease of entry into markets (Djankov, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000), the degree to which the law protects investors in 
firms, and the like (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1999).  
 To what extent are these diverse measures of the institutions governing particular 
markets consistent with each other?  How correlated are they with the aggregate indicators of 
economic freedom?  Do these indicators show a pattern of convergence over time toward 
more market-based outcomes consistent with the aggregate indices? 
 
Labour market institutions  
 
The labour market is possibly the most idiosyncratic market in modern capitalist economies.  
Union movements, employer associations, and government regulations vary widely across 
countries and also vary over time within a country.  Many analysts have sought to explain 
differences in economic performance across countries in terms of differences in labour 
market institutions (for example, Tarantelli, 1986; Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Calmfors and 
Driffil, 1988; Freeman, 1988 and OECD, 1997).  To do this, they have developed ratings of 
country wage-setting institutions and employment protection legislation, and have estimated 
union density and collective bargaining coverage.   
 Table 3 shows how 11 different analysts ranked countries by their degree of 
centralization of wage-setting from the early 1980s to the mid 1990s.  In this table a high 
number means that the analyst regards the wage setting system as highly centralized while a 
low number means that the analyst regards the system as decentralized.  The ratings are not, it 
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is important to recognize, purely subjective.  Most analysts built their rankings from a limited 
number of “facts”(such as whether there is a central union negotiating body, whether there is 
one peak federation or many, etc).  Indeed, several of the rankings give ties to the countries 
because these building block facts gave similar numbers to the countries.  Still, there is 
subjectivity in the building blocks chosen and, perhaps more importantly, in the equal 
weights that analysts accord them in aggregating to a single statistic, just as there is in the 
freedom indices.  The multiple ratings for particular countries over time allow us to examine 
the consistency of these measures in any time period as well as to assess changes over time.   
 Consider first consistency within periods.  In general, different analysts rate 
countries similarly in the same time period – the US for instance is always among the most 
decentralized countries while Sweden and Norway are among the most centralized.  The 
correlation between the rankings within the early 1980s is 0.90; that for 1986 is 0.69; that for 
1991 is 0.75.  But there are some striking differences in the placing of particular countries 
over time, which can affect claims about the relationship between wage-setting and economic 
outcomes.  One such difference is in the different rank of France and Japan in the two 
assessments in 1984, which produces a low within-period correlation of 0.24.  What is going 
on here?  The 1984 ranking in the third column by Camerson is based on his assessment of 
the internal structure of the unions, while the ranking by Lembrucht in the next column is 
based on his assessment of the influence of unions on policy formulation.  Lembrucht rates 
France as highly centralized while Cameron rates it as decentralized.  Which representation 
best fits French wage-setting?  The issue in part hinges on how important the SMIC is in 
determining overall wage patterns, since the SMIC is centrally determined.  Most analysts 
place France in the more decentralized camp, making Lembrucht’s categorization the 
minority view.   
 As for Japan, there is disagreement in each period on where Japan fits in the 
centralization/decentralization ladder.  In the late 1980s measures, for example, we see that 
analysts differ about the rank of Japan just as Lembrucht and Cameron did in the early 1980s 
rankings.  When Japan was doing exceptionally well, its place in the ordering of countries 
was important in reaching any conclusion about the link between centralization and 
outcomes.  Call Japan wage-setting largely market-determined and that group of countries 
looked better. Call Japan an institutional wage-setter and those countries looked better.  As 
Japan has some features that place it in the market wage-setting camp (plant level unions, 
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firm-based bonuses, no centralized bargaining) and some features that put it in the 
institutional wage-setting camp (the Shunto offensive, the role of Nikkairen in formulating 
employer wage policy, and extraordinarily narrow dispersion of wage settlements), there is 
no easy resolution to this disagreement  The weakened performance of Japan in the 1990s 
makes the rating of Japan in the wage determining scales less critical than it was in earlier 
decades.  There are other oddities in the indices.  Given the importance of the Scala Mobile in 
wage-setting in Italy, the general agreement among analysts that Italy was one of the most 
decentralized wage-setting countries strikes me as bizarre.  During its hayday the Scala 
Mobile reduced dispersion of pay nearly as much in Italy as centralized bargaining did in 
Sweden (Ichino and Erickson, 1995 and Manacorda, 1999).  The focus of the indices on the 
characteristics of union and management bargaining gives a misleading picture of the extent 
to which wages were centrally determined. 
 Some countries changed their ranking in centralization of wage-setting in the 
period covered.  The UK moved from a largely collectively bargained system of wage-setting 
to a largely market determined system.  New Zealand follows a similar pattern.  But rankings 
can only tell us about changes in relative position.  The final column in the table gives 
absolute changes in centralization of wage-setting as reported by Elmeskov, Martin, and 
Scarpetta (1998).  They code countries from 1 (decentralized wage setting) to 3 (coordinated 
or centralized) and specify periods of change.  Eight countries change their wage-setting 
stance in the period they covered., with five moving towards less centralized institutions 
while the Netherlands, Ireland, and Italy moved in the opposite direction pattern.  I disagree 
with the Elmsekov et al reading of the Italian pattern also, on the grounds that Italy became 
less centralized in wage-setting when it abandoned the Scala Mobile in the early 1990s, 
whereas they have Italy moving from decentralized to centralized in this period.   
 Table 4 turns from experts’ rating of countries by the centralization of their wage-
setting to more objective measures of union density and collective bargaining coverage in 
1980 and 1997 (with some coverage figures for 1994).  The table shows much higher 
collective bargaining coverage than union density in several countries.  France is the most 
striking case in point, with union density of 22% in 1980 and 10% in 1997 compared to levels 
of coverage of 85% (1980) and 95% (1994).  The cause of the huge divergence, are 
mandatory extension laws that extend union contracts to non-union workplaces.   
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 I have grouped the countries in the exhibit into four rough categories, depending 
on how density and coverage changed.  Overall dens ity fell in 12 countries, was roughly 
stable in 5 countries, and rose in just 3 countries.  As a result the unweighted density dropped 
noticeably in the near two decades covered.  But this drop did not translate into a comparable 
fall in collective bargaining coverage.  Coverage fell in just five countries and was roughly 
stable in all the others countries.  In contrast to the convergence in institutions in the Fraser 
freedom index and in the measure of centralization of wage-setting, both the density and 
coverage figures show divergence over time.  The coefficient of variation of density rises 
from 0.41 to 0.59 while the coefficient of variation of coverage rises from 0.30 to 0.39. 
Overall, the pattern of change in coverage suggests that there are two attractors operating in 
“institution space” – one with near 100% coverage and another with near 0% coverage.  It is 
not difficult to develop an argument as to why union-management relations should produce 
such multiple equilibria (Freeman, 1998). 
 Some advanced OECD countries like Spain, Portugal or Italy make it difficult to 
lay off workers with permanent contracts, which presumably reduces hiring as well.  German 
and Belgium laws make it difficult to hire temporary labor.  Virtually all EU countries with 
works councils require management to consult with workers about plant closings, which 
invariably delays closures and increases their cost.  Employment protection policies 
effectively shift the property rights of a job from management to the incumbent worker.  This 
will have no effect on resource allocation as long as transactions costs are small, but will 
affect employment and unemployment when transactions costs are relatively high.   
 Table 5 records ratings of the strictness of the EPL regulations in the late 1980s 
and late 1990s by the OECD and in 1990 and 1998 by Nicoletti et al, (1999).  The scores 
given to the regulations are scaled so that low values (minimum of 0) imply little 
employment protection while high values (maximum of 6) imply considerable employment 
protection.  The A measures are based on data for regular contracts and temporary contracts.  
The B measures are based on information for those contracts and on information about 
collective dismissals.  All the EPL measures show that the Anglo-Saxon countries led by the 
US have the least restrictions on the rights of employers to alter employment at will.  Using a 
factor analysis mode of scoring, Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud rated the UK second to the 
US in both 1990 and 1998 (columns 5 and 6). 
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 The measures of change in EPL regulations in columns 4 and 7 show, however,  
that in most countries with high EPIs the level of protection fell in the 1990s.  The most 
prominent and widely studied case is that of Spain, which had very tight restrictions, and then 
introduced temporary contracts to encourage firms to hire workers.  These contracts have 
come to cover over one-third of the work force, though they do not seem to have done much 
to improve the operation of the Spanish job market.  With the countries that have high 
employment protection reducing their protection and the countries that have low protection 
maintaining their low levels of protection, the variation among OECD countries in EPL 
legislation has diminished.  Barring a compensating increase in the impact of EPL regulations 
on outcomes, the fall in variation implies that the effect of EPL legislation in explaining 
variation in outcomes is less in the late 1990s than it was a decade earlier.  
 How well correlated are the measures of labor market institutions in Tables 3 -5 
with the broader freedom indices in Table 1?7  In general there is a reasonably high 
correlation between the scores for centralized wage setting, union density/collective 
coverage, and employment protection, and the indices of economic freedom.  The 1991 
Layard, Nickell, and Jackman rating of the wage-setting system of countries, for instance, 
which gave low values to countries with decentralized wage setting  is correlated -0.60 with 
the Fraser index, which gave high values for countries with less restricted markets.  The rate 
of union density is correlated -0.32 with the Fraser index, indicating that the more highly 
unionized countries scored lower in market freedoms.  This presumably reflects their social 
democratic orientation, which favors collective activities over the individual market freedoms 
captured by the index.  The Fraser index is correlated at -0.86 with the late 1990s OECD B-
index and at -0.81 with the Nicoletti et al, (1999) measures of the strength of EPL legislation.  
The implication is that the Fraser index does a reasonably good job in capturing the variation 
across countries in labour market institutions, although the labour market is a relatively 
modest factor in the index. 
 
 
                                                 
7 There are other ways to measure labor market institutions.  Using data on laws gathered by 
La Porta et al, (1997).  I have tabulated summary measures that show how the advanced 
OECD countries differ in constitutional protection of labor, ILO conventions, and diverse 
other regulations.  Using these measures as indicators of institutions does not change the 
findings of this study.   
  
1 2 
12 
Product market and business formation regulations  
 
All countries regulate how firms operate in product markets.  They protect consumers 
through labeling and related laws; they seek to minimize monopolistic behaviour through 
anti-trust policies; and try to influence market outcomes in va rious ways for any number of 
political economy reasons, including the opportunity that regulations give politicians and 
bureaucrats to extract bribes from businesses.  
 To assess the extent and intrusiveness of regulations on business the OECD sent a 
detailed questionnaire to member states in 1998 asking for information on 1300 different 
regulations concerning economy-wide and industry specific laws, regulations and 
administration of laws.  The responses to this questionnaire form the basis of the OECD 
regulatory data base, which is by far the most comprehensive and detailed body of 
information on product market regulations across countries.  The data base has two important 
limitations.  First, it is limited to administrative regulations, which means that it excludes 
judicial system regulations of product markets.  Since the US makes greater use of courts and 
court suits, which can be expensive and time-consuming, the index arguably gives the US a 
more market-friendly environment than in fact exists.  Only in the US do court suits have the 
potential for bankrupting tobacco firms and only in the US are product liability law suits a 
major concern for business.  Second, the OECD regulatory data base does not treat 
adequately the extent to which state regulators actually enforce regulations, which depends 
on state funding of government agencies, the salaries paid to civil servants, and modes of 
compliance. 
 The principal report using the data base (Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud, 1999) 
employs a factor analysis model to analyze the extent of regulatory procedures in several 
domains.  It differentiates between inward oriented regulations, covering state control of 
industry, barriers to entrepreneurship, and regulations of domestic markets; and outward-
oriented regulations, covering barriers to trade and investment. To summarize the extent of 
regulation across all domains, Nicoletti et al aggregate the statistics into a single market 
measure.  Different aggregations of the responses to the 1300 or so questions in the database 
would give different measures to each country than Nicoletti et al produce, but would 
presumably give a similar ordering of countries by the scope and depth of regulatory 
practices.  I use the Nicoletti et al measures in this paper. 
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 Table 6 records the product market regulatory scores for the OECD countries. 
The scaling is such that higher scores mean a thicker and more intrusive set of regulations 
and thus one nominally less friendly to market mechanisms.  In all of the inward oriented 
regulatory domains and overall, the UK is the least regulated economy.  The US, Ireland, and 
Australia also show limited regulatory activity.  At the other end of the spectrum, Italy, 
Norway and Greece have the most highly regulated product markets.  As with other indices, 
the regulatory scales show some odd results for particular countries that highlight the 
problems of developing simple scales for country institutions.  In the case at hand, the OECD 
gives the UK has a lower score in barriers to entrepreneurship than the US, the hot bed for 
entrepreneurial activity.  The difference between the US and UK comes from two sub 
indices:  one that measures the “regulatory and administrative opacity” (attributed to the high 
number of administrative procedures and services involved in business startups) and barriers 
to competition.  In the former case, it disagrees with the La Porta et al count of the number of 
procedures and time needed to start a business in the two countries, which shows the US to 
have lower barriers to entrepreneurship.  Perhaps more important, the OECD index does not 
take account of relatively lenient US bankruptcy laws, which enable entrepreneurs to fail and 
start up again with impunity. 
 The overall product market regulation score correlates reasonably well with the 
various measures of economic freedom:  0.69 with the Fraser Index, 0.60 with the Heritage 
Foundation/WSJ index, and 0.53 with the Freedom House index.  But there are some 
differences between the product market regulatory score and the indices of economic 
freedom. For example, New Zealand has a regulatory index that differs only modestly from 
that for Germany, for instance, whereas the two countries differ greatly in the indices of 
economic freedom.  In addition, the scaling of the product regulation regulations differs so 
much from the scaling of the indices of the indices of freedom as to invalidate any 
comparison in the variation of institutions that each reports.  The measures of economic 
freedom vary from 0 to 100, whereas the regulatory scores vary over a greater range, 
producing much larger coefficients of variation in scores.  Because the OECD first asked 
countries about their regulatory regimes in the late 1990s, we cannot ascertain whether the 
cross-country variation declined over time, as did the variation in freedom indices. 
 Finally, note that the OECD regulatory scores are much less well correlated with 
the measures of the centralization of wage-setting than with the freedom indices.  The 
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correlation of the OECD regulatory score with the Layard et al, (1991) rating of wage-setting, 
for example, is just 0.36.  The fact that the wage and product market indices are more highly 
correlated with the indices of economic freedom than with each other suggests that the 
freedom indices are good summary measures while the other indices are in fact reflecting the 
particular markets on which they focus.   
 To assess the ease of starting a new business, researchers in corporate finance 
have gathered data on regulations covering start-ups (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
2000).  Columns 1-3 of Table 7 summarize their analysis in terms of three broad measures of 
the eases of business formation:  the estimated number of procedures needed to start a 
business, the estimated time to meet those requirements; and the estimated direct and indirect 
cost of meeting the requirements relative to gdp per capita.  Djankav et al note the wide 
variation in these measures: 
 
“To meet government requirements for starting to operate a business in Austria, 
an entrepreneur must complete 12 procedures taking at least 154 days and pay 
US$11,612 in government fees” (Djankov et al, p 1). 
 
This compares with 4 procedures that take 7 days at a cost of $2806 in the US and even less 
in Canada (Djankov, et al, Table III).  The table shows that Greece, Portugal, Austria, 
Netherlands are the most difficult countries in which to form a new business, while the US, 
UK, Denmark, Canada, Finland, and New Zealand are the easiest. 
 To assess the protection given to investors to invest or loan money to firms, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) have developed indices of the rights of 
investors and creditors in the various countries.  Columns 4-7 of Table 7 present their 
summary of the assessment of law and order in the country (on a scale from 0 to 10), based 
on the International Country Risk Guide, and their indices of shareholder rights (scale of 0 to 
4)  and creditor rights (scale of 0 to 5).  The majority of the advanced countries obtain the 
highest value in the rule of law measure, with however some of the lower income countries 
scoring substantially lower than the maximum 10 score.  There is greater variation in the 
protections given to shareholders and creditors, at least by these measures.  The US, for 
instance, provides considerable anti-director protection while Italy does not; whereas the UK 
provides considerable creditor rights while France does not.  La Porta et al show that the 
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different legal codes produce different corporate valuations, but do not attempt to link these 
institutional differences to differences in aggregate national economic outcomes. 
 
 
3.  Institutions and Outcomes 
 
Are the measures of economic institutions related to outcomes in the OECD countries? 
 Most statistical analyses of this question have linked measures of institutions in 
specific markets, usually the labour market, to ensuing economic performance.  The absence 
of reliable data on changes in institutions over time has made longitudinal analysis that 
assesses how differences in institutions affect differences in outcomes across countries rare.  
Studies that use a before/after methodology focus on particular countries where institutions 
changed markedly (ie New Zealand, or the UK before and after Mrs. Thatcher), which makes 
it difficult to define an appropriate counterfactual – what would have happened in that 
country absent the change.   
 The existence of the Fraser economic freedom indices from 1970 to the present 
allow for a broader longitudinal analysis that can include individual country fixed effects, 
wiping out unobserved (fixed) country characteristics to focus on changes over time.  As I 
have demonstrated, moreover, the indices are sufficiently correlated with most indicators for 
specific markets to provide a reasonable measure of the market- friendliness of country 
economic institutions.  In any case, to assess the link between institutions and outcomes, I 
have estimated two types of models: 
 
 (1) Outcome = a + b FRASER + COUNTRY DUMMIES + YEAR DUMMIES 
 (2) DOutcome = a + b FRASER + COUNTRY DUMMIES + YEAR DUMMIES 
 
where Outcome is the particular outcome, FRASER is the Fraser index, DOutcome is the 
change in the outcome over the succeeding five years, and where the country and year 
dummies are included to remove country fixed effects and year effects.   
 The first model relates the level of outcome to the level of the Fraser index, but 
by including the fixed country effects, it does so in a “difference” format:  comparing 
deviations of outcomes from their mean value with deviations of the Fraser index from its 
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mean value.  The second model relates the change in outcome between year t and year t+5 to 
the Fraser index in year t.  I chose the five year period because the Foundation provided new 
indices every five years (until 1997).  In this calculation, I also performed calculations in 
which lagged values of the outcome variable were also entered in the equations. 
 Table 8 records the coefficients on the Fraser index in regressions for 23 
countries in five year periods from 1970 to 1999.  The outcome measures in the calculations 
are:  lnGDP per capita; ln GDP, ln GDP/Employees; ln Employment/Population; ln GDP 
deflator (in the change form) and the rate of unemployment (in the level form).  Each data 
point is a country year observation.  Because the index is produced on a five year basis, there 
are 6 observations per country, giving a data set with 138 records.  In panel A the dependent 
variables are changes in ln outcomes.  In panel B the dependent variables are levels of 
outcomes.   
 Column (1) in both panels give the basic cross section regression of the 
dependent variable on the Fraser index and year dummies.  Column (2) adds country 
dummies, so that the analysis treats within country differences.  Column (3) adds a squared 
Fraser term to the regression to see if there is any support for the U-shaped hypothesis that 
countries with the most/least market freedoms operate similarly, per Calmfors and Driffil and 
per the Mancur Olson argument about all-encompassing unions.  The column (1) calculations 
show some links between the Fraser index and outcomes, largely in the level calculations in 
panel b.  Countries with high degrees of market freedom have higher GDP per capita (call it 
the North American effect), high employment-population rates, high GDP per employee 
rates, and lower unemployment.  But they lose some of their edge in the panel regressions for 
changes in variables (particularly in gdp per employee).  Addition of the country dummies, 
however, eliminates virtually all of the relationships, save for an effect on unemployment 
rates in the level regressions.  With country dummies, moreover, there is only a glimmer of 
support for the U-shaped hypothesis.  Overall, with inclusion of country dummies, there is no 
discernible link between the Fraser indices and outcomes 
 There are three possible interpretations of these results.  First, it may be that the 
stress that economists put on market freedoms, while supported by cross sectional analyses, 
vastly exaggerates the impact that changes in market freedoms have on economic success.  
To see if this is the case, I have replicated the growth and level regressions of outputs on the 
Fraser indices for GDP per capita (using World Bank rather than OECD data) for a wider 
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range of countries that includes less developed countries.  Addition of LDCs to the analysis 
produces much greater variation in institutions, with the Fraser indices of market freedoms 
ranging from 1.6 in Myanmar in 1995 to the levels shown in Table 1 for the advanced OECD 
countries.  The calculations in Table 9 show a striking difference between the results for 
OECD countries and LDCs (all countries save for OECD countries and NICs).  For OECD 
countries, the results mimic Table 8:  insignificant effects, however the model is specified.  
For LDCs, by contrast, we obtain a positive effect of the Fraser index measures of economic 
freedom on GDP per capita in the fixed effect country analysis.  These computations indicate 
that changes in market freedoms over a wider range of institut ional settings produce changes 
in economic outcomes, and thus reject the first proposed explanation for the negligible OECD 
results. 
 Second, it may be that the Fraser indices are insufficiently refined measures of the 
institutional differences among OECD countries to uncover any institution-outcome 
relationship.  The Fraser and other measures of market freedoms are broad indices that do not 
capture the fine points of labor market institutions, product market regulations, or regulations 
of business formation or investor protections shown in the tables on particular institutions.  
The absence of time series data on these detailed measures rules out any definitive test of this 
hypothesis, but the cross section variation in them is no more correlated with economic 
performance than the Fraser indices.  This makes it unlikely that time series variation in these 
measures would explain the changing relative fortunes of OECD countries better than the 
aggregate Fraser indices. 
 The third explanation, which I regard as the most natural one, is that the observed 
patterns do not support the superiority of particular brands of advanced capitalism.  Within 
the range of variation in institutions that differentiate the US, UK, Germany, Sweden, Japan, 
and so on, there is either a relatively flat or a multiple peaked link between institutions and 
outcomes.  Outside that range ins titutional variation may have large effects on outcomes, but 
once a country has a strong tradition of basic market freedoms – protection of property, rule 
of law, private ownership rights, viability of contracts, etc – it has considerable leeway in the 
precise way it structures its institutions.  Advanced capitalism is a sturdy economic system 
that allows for diversity in institutional arrangements.  
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Table 1:  Measures of Economic Freedom/Market 
Friendliness and Competitiveness, 1996 
 
Fraser Heritage/WSJ Freedom Competitiveneness 
1995 1996 House  1996 Rank (High) 
(high) (low) (High)  1996 1999 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Australia  86 2.05 14  16 8 
Austria  78 2.10 15  15 14 
Belgium 82 2.10    15  13 16 
Canada 84 2.10  15  10 2 
Denmark 81 2.00  16  3 12 
Finland 81 2.35  14  12 7 
France 81 2.30  15  17 15 
Germany 82 2.20  15  8 17 
Greece 68 2.90  12  22 21 
Ireland 86 2.10  15  18 6 
Italy 75 2.60  13  19 20 
Japan 82 2.05  13  2 10 
Lux 84 2.00  –  6 – 
Neth 84 1.90  16  5 9 
N Zealand 91 1.80  16  9 5 
Norway 81 2.45  15  4 11 
Portugal 78 2.65  14  21 19 
Spain 79 2.70  14  20 18 
Sweden 79 2.65  16  11 13 
Switz 85 1.95  14  7 3 
UK 88 1.90  16  14 4 
US 89 1.85  16  1 1 
 
Ave 82 2.3  14.7  -- 
NICs 86 3.2  10.3  -- 
Latin Am 72 2.9  10.5  -- 
Africa 51 3.5  9.3  -- 
Asia 58 3.4  9.8  -- 
Rest of Eur  56 3.3  9.9  -- 
Others 63 3.3  12.3  -- 
 
 
Source:  Tabulated from Richard F. Messick, World Survey of Economic Freedom, 
 1995-1996 
 Heritage Foundation, Index of economic freedom, www.heritage.org/index/ 
 Fraser Foundation, Economic Freedom of the world, 
 www.freetheworld.com/release.html 
 World Economic Forum  www.weforum.org  
 IMD/World Economic Forum, The World Competitiveness Report 1990, 1999 
  
1 9 
19 
Table 2:  Fraser Institute Economic Freedom Ratings: 
Advanced OECD Economies in 1970-1997 
 
        Change Rank 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1997 1980-1997 1980-1997 
            
Australia 81 69 74 78 81 86 86  12 11 7 
Austria 72 62 68 69 76 78 80  12 16 25 
Belgium 93 78 80 81 81 82 83  3 5 14 
Canada 81 77 80 82 85 84 86  6 5 7 
Denmark 76 67 68 69 77 81 84  16 16 12 
Finland 81 67 71 74 77 81 82  11 13 18 
France 73 63 63 64 78 81 80  17 25 25 
Germany 82 77 78 79 83 82 81  3 8 22 
Greece 63 58 57 52 61 68 74  27 38 42 
Ireland 68 62 66 67 73 86 87  21 21 6 
Italy 68 55 55 60 74 75 79  24 44 31 
Japan 73 70 74 77 83 82 83  9 11 14 
Luxembourg 91 88 90 94 83 84 85  -5 1 9 
Netherlands 86 74 78 78 81 84 85  7 8 9 
New Zealand 70 60 64 62 81 91 91  27 24 3 
Norway 70 61 62 68 77 81 81  19 28 22 
Portugal 56 34 56 57 64 78 80  24 41 25 
Spain 65 59 62 63 70 79 82  20 28 18 
Sweden 62 62 63 70 75 79 80  17 25 25 
Switzerland 89 80 84 87 86 85 85  1 4 9 
United Kingdom 66 59 68 82 86 88 89  21 16 5 
US 80 81 85 86 88 89 90  5 3 4 
            
Mean 74 66 70 72 78 82 83     
Coefficient of Var .14 .19 .15 .15 .09 .06 .05     
 
 
Source:  Tabulated from Gwartney and Lawson (2000). 
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Table 3:  Ranking of Advanced Countries 
in Centralization/Decentralization in Wage Setting (High=Centralized) 
  
Early 1980s 
 
Mid 1980s 
Late 
1980s 
 
Early 1990s 
 
Mid 1990s 
 1979 1981 1984 1984 1986 1986 1988 1990 1991 1991 1995 
Australia  10 - 9 3 3 10 8 - 4 7 2,1988+,1 
Austria  16 15 16 15 17 16 17 10 18 17 3 
Belgium 8 9 15 10 9 6 10 - 10 11 2 
Canada 1 5 5 3 2 5 1 - 2 3 1 
Denmark 13 12 13 10 11 12 14 - 14 17 3 
Finland 12 12 14 10 10 8 13 - 11 17 3-.>2 
France 5 3 2 18 5 3 7 3 7 11 2 
Germany 9 8 11 10 16 15 12 6 12 14 3 
Italy 3 1 6 6 4 1 5 4 6 7 1,1992+,3 
Japan 6 - 3 18 8 14 4 11 9 11 1 
Netherlands 7 10 12 15 15 9 11 5 15 11 2,1988+,3 
New Zealand 11 - - 3 7 4 9 - 3 3 2,1991+,1 
Norway  15 14 17 17 13 11 16 8 17 17 3 
Portugal - - - - - - - - - - 2 
Spain - - 1 - - - - - - 7 3,1985+,2 
Sweden 14 12 18 15 13 13 15 7 16 17 3->2 
Switzerland -  7 7 10 12 - 3 9 13 11 - 
UK 4 2 10 6 6 2 6 2 5 3 2->1 
US 2 5 4 3 1 7 2 1 1 3 1 
 
 
Source:  OECD Employment Outlook, July 1997, Table 3.4.  The columns are from the 
following studies:  1979 Blyth; 1981 Schmitter; 1984 Cameron; 1984 Lehmbruch; 1986 
Bruno and Sachs ; 1986 Tarantelli; 1988 Calmfors/Driffil; 1990 Soskice; 1991 
Lipjphart/Crepaz; 1991 Layard, Nickell,Jackman; 1995 Elmeskov, Martin, Scarpetta. 
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Table 4: 
The Increasing Diversity of Unionism and Collective Bargaining, 1980-1997 
 
 
 DENSITY COVERAGE 
 1980 1997 1980 1994/97 
Declining Density & Coverage 
    UK 
    US 
    Japan 
    New Zealand 
    Australia 
 
50 
22 
31 
56 
48 
 
30 
16 
21 
30 
35 
 
70 
26 
28 
67 
88 
 
44 
18 
18 
31 
80 
Declining Density & Stable/Rising Coverage 
    Austria 
    France 
    Germany 
    Italy 
    Netherlands 
    Portugal 
    Switzerland 
 
52 
22 
36 
50 
35 
52 
31 
 
39 
10 
29 
37 
24 
30 
23 
 
98 
85 
91 
85 
76 
70 
53 
 
98 
95 
92 
82 
81 
71 
50 
Stable Density/Coverage 
    Belgium 
    Canada 
    Denmark 
    Norway 
 
53 
36 
79 
55 
 
53 
38 
76 
55 
 
90 
37 
69 
75 
 
90 
36 
69 
74 
Rising Density & Stable/Rising Coverage 
    Finland 
    Spain 
    Sweden 
 
69 
8   
78 
 
88 
17 
86 
 
95 
76 
86 
 
95 
78 
89 
Average  45 39 72 68 
Coefficient of Variation .41 .59 .30 .39 
#5 Relative to #15 1.6 2.3 1.3 1.8 
 
 
Source:  OECD Employment Outlook, July 1997, Table 3.3, with updates from 
Blanchflower, 2000.
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Table 5:  Employment Protection Indices 
 
 OECD Nicoletti et al 
 Late 1980s Late 1990s Change 1990 1998 Change 
 A A B (A)    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
European Union        
Austria 2.2 2.2 2.3 0 2.4 2.4 0.0 
Belgium 3.1 2.1 2.5 -1.0 3.0 2.1 -0.9 
Denmark 2.1 1.2 1.5 -0.9 2.4 1.5 -0.9 
Finland 2.3 2.0 2.1 -0.3 2.2 2.1 -0.1 
France 2.7 3.0 2.8  0.3 2.7 3.1 0.4 
Germany 3.2 2.5 2.6 -0.7 2.9 2.8 -0.1 
Greece 3.6 3.6 3.5 0.0 3.6 3.5 -0.1 
Ireland 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 
Italy 4.1 3.3 3.4 -0.8 4.2 3.3 -0.9 
Netherlands 2.7 2.1 2.1 -0.6 3.1 2.4 -0.7 
Norway 3.0 2.6 2.6 -0.4 3.1 2.9 -0.2 
Portugal 4.1 3.7 3.7 -0.4 4.2 3.7 -0.5 
Spain 3.7 3.1 3.1 -0.6 3.7 3.2 -0.5 
Sweden 3.5 2.2 2.6 -1.3 3.4 2.4 -0.1 
Switzerland 1.0 1.0 1.5 0.0 1.3 1.3 0.0 
United Kingdom 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 
        
Non-EU countries        
Australia 0.9 0.9 1.2 0.0 1.1 1.1 0.0 
Canada 0.6 0.6 1.1 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 
Japan % 2.4 2.3 % 2.6 2.6 0.0 
New Zealand % 2.6 0.9 % 1.0 1.0 0.0 
US 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 
 
 
Source:  Columns, 1-3, OECD, Employment Outlook, 1999, Table 2.5 
 Column 4 gives the difference between columns 1 and 2 
 Columns 5 and 6, Nicolletti et al, Table A3.11, but my EPL change is the change in 
EPL 1998 and EPL 1990, not the figures they report, as they seem to have transposed the 
EPL and EPL regular contracts columns for changes  
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Table 6:  Country Regulatory Policies of Advanced Economies, 
Indices from OECD 1998 Regulatory Data Base 
 
 
 Inward Oriented Regulations  Outward Oriented Overall Product 
 State Barriers to Regulation Total Barriers Market Regs 
 Control Entrepren Admin Eco  To Trd/Inv  
        
European Union        
Austria 211 160 160 210 118 54 140 
Belgium 278 255 300 240 270 63 190 
Denmark 246 132 110 230 190 54 140 
Finland 268 193 220 210 230 63 170 
France 263 273 310 230 270 103 210 
Germany 176 210 270 140 190 54 140 
Greece 387 166 200 310 270 132 220 
Ireland 94 120 150 80 80 43 80 
Italy 392 274 300 350 330 49 230 
Netherlands 228 141 150 210 180 54 140 
Norway 319 133 140 270 220 215 220 
Portugal 283 146 150 250 210 107 170 
Spain 259 177 230 210 220 68 160 
Sweden 151 180 200 130 170 84 140 
Switzerland 208 224 260 190 220 132 180 
United Kingdom 55 48 50 60 50 43 50 
        
Non-EU        
Australia 126 113 110 130 120 43 90 
Canada 129 80 90 110 100 215 150 
Japan 129 233 270 140 180 102 150 
New Zealand 166 121 150 140 140 95 130 
US 85 126 70 100 110 87 100 
 
 
Source:  Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud 
 State control, Table A3-1 
 barriers to entrepreneurship, Table A3-2 
 administrative regulation, Table A3-4 
 economic regulation, Table A3-5 
 total inward oriented policies, Table A3-6 
 barriers to trade/investment, Table A3-3 
 total, product market regulation, Table A3-7 
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Table 7:  Regulation of Business Formation and Protection of Investors  
in Advanced OECD Countries 
 
 Business Formation Protection of Investors  (higher=better) 
 # Procedures 
required 
Days to get 
Approval 
Cost/GDP 
Per Capita 
Rule of Law Anti-Director 
Rights 
Creditor 
Rights 
       
Australia 3 3 .0209 10 4 1 
Austria 12 154 .4545 10 2 3 
Belgium 8 42 .1001 10 0 2 
Canada 2 2 .0140 10 4 1 
Denmark 5 21 .0136 10 3 3 
Finland 4 32 .0199 10 2 1 
France 16 66 .1970 8.98 2 0 
Germany 7 90 .0851 9.23 1 3 
Greece 13 53 .4799 6.18 1 1 
Ireland 4 25 .1145 7.80 3 1 
Italy 11 121 .2474 8.33 0 2 
Japan 11 50 .1144 8.98 3 2 
Neth 8 77 .3031 10 2 2 
N Zealand 3 17 .0042 10 4 3 
Norway 6 24 .0249 10 3 2 
Portugal 12 99 .3129 8.68 2 1 
Spain 11 83 .1269 7.80 2 2 
Sweden 4 17 .0254 10 2 2 
Switz 12 88 .1336 10 1 1 
UK 7 11 .0056 8.57 4 4 
US 4 7 .0096 10 5 1 
 
Source:  Djankov, Simeon; La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei, 
 “The Regulation of Entry”, NBER Working Paper 7892 September 2000; La Porta, Lopez-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, “Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation” NBER Working 
Paper 7403, October 1999; La Porta, Lopez-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, “Legal 
Determinants of External Finance”, NBER Working Paper 5879, January 1997. 
 
a)  Table III, number of procedures = sum of safety & health, environment, taxes, 
labor, screening,; time = estimated days before firm can start operation; cost = time and direct 
cost of meeting requirements as fraction of GDP per capita in 1997. 
 
b)  Rule of Law, based on International Country Risk Guide. 
     Anti-Director Rights, index that measures shareholder rights, range from 0 to 5. 
     Creditor Rights, range from 0 to 4.
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Table 8:  Coefficients and Standard Errors on the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom 
in Regressions of Ln Changes and level of Macro Variables, 1970-99:   
OECD ADVANCED COUNTRIES 
 
A) Ln Changes:  Fraser Fraser2 Year Dummy  
Country 
Dummy  R2 
 ^ ln GDP/Capita  (1) -.006 (.006) -- -- Y -- .183 
 (2) .001 (.011) -- -- Y Y .449 
 (3) -.038 (.056) .003 (.004) Y Y .451 
^ ln GDP 
 (1) -.005 (.006) -- -- Y -- .188 
 (2) .001 (.011) -- -- Y Y .493 
 (3) -.087 (.053) .006 (.004) Y Y .507 
^ ln GDP/employee 
 (1) -.012 (.005) -- -- Y -- .17 
 (2) -.004 (.009) -- -- Y Y .425 
 (3) -.077 (.045) .005 (.003) Y Y .439 
^  ln Employment/Population 
 (1) .005 (.005) -- – Y -- .113 
 (2) .020 (.010) -- -- Y Y .213 
 (3) -.024 (.051) .003 (.004) Y Y .219 
^  ln GDP Deflator 
 (1) -.006 (.005) -- -- Y -- .224 
 (2) .011 (.009) -- -- Y Y .564 
 (3) -.059 (.044) .005 (.003) Y Y .575 
B) Level Regressions 
ln GDP/Capita (1) .144 (.017) -- -- Y -- .593 
 (2) -.001 (.016) -- -- Y Y .929 
 (3) .046 (.078) -.003 (.006) Y Y .929 
 ln Employment/Population 
 (1) 1.349 (.759) -- -- Y -- .044 
 (2) .351 (.606) -- -- Y Y .876 
 (3) -1.718 (3.027) .152 (.218) Y Y .877 
ln GDP/employee 
 (1) .332 (.149) -- -- Y -- .053 
 (2) -.001 (.015) -- -- Y Y .998 
 (3) -.03 (.077) .002 (.006) Y Y .998 
Unemployment 
 (1) -.682 (.350) -- -- Y -- .199 
 (2) -.720 (.491) -- -- Y Y .701 
 (3) .589 (2.447) -.095 (.174) Y Y .702 
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Table 9:  Coefficients and Standard Errors on the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom in 
Regressions of Ln Changes in GDP Per Capita and in the level of GDP Per Capita, 1970-99 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Fraser  Dummy Variables Lagged R2 # obs 
 Index YEAR COUNTRY Ln GDP/cap   
Ln GDP per capita       
       
ALL COUNTRIES .083 Y Y - .976 613 
 (.012)      
       
ADVANCED OECD COUNTRIES .021 Y Y - .986 128 
 (0.14)      
       
LDC COUNTRIES .092 Y Y - .966 .461 
 (.013)      
       
       
Change in ln GDP per capita 
ensuing 5 years  
      
       
ALL COUNTRIES .023 Y Y - .772 527 
 (.008)      
       
ADVANCED OECD COUNTRIES -.011 Y Y - .953 106 
 (.011)      
       
LDC COUNTRIES .022 Y Y - .730 401 
 (.010)      
       
       
ALL COUNTRIES .032 Y Y -.333 .855 527 
 (.007)   (.022)   
       
ADVANCED OECD COUNTRIES -.001 Y Y -.211 .953 106 
 (.010)   (.072)   
       
LDC COUNTRIES .035 Y Y -.366 .966 401 
 (.008)   (.023)   
 
 
Source:  Tabulated using Fraser index and measures of real GDP per capita, from World Bank. 
Comparable results obtained using GDP figures from Penn World Tables. 
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